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Abstract. Theories that attempt to represent decision makers' preferences are usually 
based on the axiom of transitivity. On the other hand, Saaty's Eigenvalue Method of 
deriving ratio scales from pairwise comparisons is based on the assumption that the 
numerical preferences satisfy the reciprocal property. We show that this property can- 
not be derived from the usual set of axioms used to obtain order preserving value func- 
tions, but that they in turn are consequences of the reciprocal property. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Until very recently, it was believed that transi- 
tivity of preferences was essential for construct- 
ing value functions that truly represented the 
preferences of decision makers. However. this does 
not appear to be so. The literature is full of 
examples that illustrate the intransitivity of de- 
cision makers. Why should then any theory assume 
transitivity of preferences when it does not hold 
in real life? 
A cornerstone in the concept of understanding is 
coherence or consistency. What is meant by con- 
sistency varies from one subject to another. For 
example, a set of axioms is said to be consistent 
if "something satisfies the axioms" (Krantz et al., 
1971). In the area of preference and choice con- 
sistency in the ordinal sense means that when, 
given three alternatives A, B, and C, if A is 
preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then to be 
consistent A must be preferred to C. This is the 
well-known transitivity condition. We are particu- 
larly interested in individual behavior that seems 
to violate this transitivity assumption. In other 
words, people in fact express contradictory 
preferences without being bothered by such 
inconsistency. 
We observe that the process of understanding allows 
for new knowledge which may be inconsistent with 
old knowledge and may require adjustment in pre- 
vious understanding in order for the old and the 
new to relate together consistently. Thus, incon- 
sistency is allowed at first so that understanding 
may grow. The question is how should one define 
consistency in a way that tolerates a degree of 
inconsistency, thereby accommodating and measuring 
violations of consistency as a part of a theory 
which takes into consideration actual human 
behavior. 
What is needed is a method which reflects the in- 
tensity of preference so that one can tradeoff the 
alternatives with respect to the criteria. This 
means that if A is preferred to B x times, and B is 
preferred to C y times, then A is preferred to C z 
times and z = xy. Heretofore we shall call this 
cardinal consistency, or simply, consistency. It 
implies ordinal consistency but not the converse 
(see Saaty, 1980, p.191). Thus it is possible to 
be cardinally'incol;sistent but still transitive. 
Cardinal consistency implies that if A is preferred 
to B x times, then B is preferred to A l/x times so 
that A would be equally preferred to it- 
self. This is known as the reciprocal 
property of pairwise comoarisons. Thus 
lt is possible to assume the reciprocal 
property for pairwise comparisons but 
violate cardinal consistency. The recip- 
rocal property, which is weaker than 
cardinal consistency and holds between 
pairs of elements, enables us to study 
cardinal consistency and is a more genera 
notion than cardinal consistency (Saaty. 
1980). It has been possible to derive 
conditions under which reciprocal paired 
comparisons give rise to consistency and 
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to indicate when though as a set they are 
inconsistent they can still be thought of 
as permissible, thus accounting for the 
kind of inconsistency and intransitivity 
we spoke of earlier. That is, a degree 
of inconsistency is allowed to make it 
possible to integrate new knowledge at 
"odds" with old knowledge. 
The question is: given a'set of behav. 
ioral preference axioms between pairs of 
alternatives needed in the logic of tra- 
ditional decision theory: reflexivity, 
and strong completeness, it is always 
possible to assign numerical intensities 
to the comparisons; do these intensities 
satisfy the reciprocal property? It will 
be shown that the two axioms are necessary 
and sufficient for the reciprocal property 
to hold so long as the set of positive 
intensities of binary comparisons X both 
contains unity, is closed under the in- 
verse of multiplication in which a value 
x E X (x > 0) is transformed to l/x, and 
the isomorphism defined on the set X of 
intensities satisfies Cauchy's qeneral- 
ized equation f(xy) = f(x) f(y). 
What is the importance of the fact that 
pairwise comparisons can be assigned 
numerical intensities and that the recip- 
rocal property should hold? 
One consequence of this approach is that 
by adopting a fundamental scale with the 
reciprocal property one can obtain a de- 
rived scale of measurements which belongs 
to a ratio scale. Another result is that 
this approach allows one to determine from 
the binary comparisons the degree of in- 
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consistency in the numerical comparisons among all 
the alternatives without imposing tranSitiVitY Or 
consistency itself. 
MEASUREMENT FOR PREFERENCE RELATIONS 
WITH TRANSITIVITY 
Let A be a finite set of alternatives and let C be 
a set of criteria, properties or attributes by means 
of which binary relations are constructed. Let k, 
C E C be a binary relation on A. Given Ai,Aj E A, 
A. , 3 Aj represents that Ai is more preferred (or 
dominates) or equally preferred to Aj according to 
c E c. Let Ai = C Aj denote that Ai is equally 
preferred to Aj according to C E C. 
Axiom 1 (Strong Completeness): For Ai.Aj E A, 
A. , 3 Aj or Aj Q Ai. 
We will write Ai =c Aj if Ai 2 Aj and Aj > Ai. 
Axiom 2 (Reflexivity): Ai 2 Ai for all Ai E A. 
The general approach given here subsumes the soecial 
case of preference relations that are strongly com- 
plete quasi orders. A strongly complete quasi order 
is equivalent to the above two axioms together with 
transitivity. We begin by introducing this special 
case and prove the existence of a mapping PC: 
A x A -t R+and show that it is reciprocal and order 
preserving. We then drop the transitivity require- 
ment from the special case and prove the existence 
of PC in general. 
Definition 1: 2 is a transitive binary relation on 
A if and only if for all Ai, Aj and Ak E A, Ai 2 Aj 
and Aj k Ak imply Ai 3 Ak. 
Definition 2: % is a quasi order on A if and only 
if it is reflexive (Axiom 2). and transitive. 
Definition 3: A mapping PC: A x A + Rt is said to 
be consistent if and only if Pc(Ai,Aj) - Pc(Aj,Ak)= 
PC(Ai.Ak) for all Ai, Aj, Ak E A. 
Definition 4: A mapping PC: A x A + Rtis said to 
be order preserving if and only if 
A i k Aj = Pc(Ai,Aj) 2 1. 
Theorem 1: If 3 is a strongly complete quasi order 
on A, then there is a real-valued order preserving 
function PC on A x A such that 
PC(Ai,Aj) - PC(Aj,Ak) = PC(Ai,Ak) for all 
Ai, Aj, Ak E A. 
Proof: To prove this theorem we use the following 
l-&i?&? [Debreu, 19541. 
"Let A be a completely ordered set whose 
quotient A/=C is countable. There exists 
on A a real, order preserving function, 
continuous in any natural typology." 
In our case A is a finite set. Hence the quotient 
is countable. Thus, there exists a real function 
g:A x A + R+such that 
A i 2 Aj If and only if g(Ai) L g(Aj) 
for all Ai.A. c A. 
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Let Pc(Ai.Aj) s g(Ai)/g(Aj) for all Ai.Aj c A. By 
construction PC is consistent and the result 
follows. 
From Theorem 1 it can be easily seen that consist- 
ency is a more restrictive property than transitiv- 
ity. If PC is consistent then the binary relation 
2 must be transitive. However, the converse is 
not always true. For example, if P (A.,A.) 2 1, 
C 1 J 
P 
C J'k - 
(A. A ) , 1, and PC(Ai.Ak) 5 1, for all Ai,Aj,Ak 
E A, then we have Ai 2 Aj, Aj k Ak and Ai 2 Ak, 
for all Ai,Aj,Ak E A. However, one could have 
PC(Ai,Aj) - Pc(Aj,Ak) f PC(Ai,Ak), for some Ai, Aj 
and Ak. Then PC would not be a consistent function 
and > -c is still transitive. 
FUNDAMENTAL MEASUREMENT FOR PREFERENCES 
WITHOUT TRANSITIVITY 
Let A be a countable set of alternatives. 
Lermnal: Ifk satisfies Axioms 1 and 2 on A, then 
there exists a real valued function PC: A x A -+ Rt 
such that 
(1) PC(Ai.Ai) = 1. Ai E A, 
(2) If Ai 2 Aj then Pc(Aj,Ai) 5 PC(Ai,Aj), 
Ai,Aj c A, 
(3) If Pc(Ai,Aj) z PC(Ah,Ai) then 
PC(Aj,Ai) 5 PC(Ak.Ah) Ai.Aj,Ah>Ak c A. 
Proof: Select all pairs (Ai.Aj) E A x A such that 
A. 1 % Aj' Define PC as follows: 
PC(Ai,Ai) = a E R+, for all Ai E A, 
PC(Ai ,Aj) = 
aij > a, if Ai 2 Aj and Ai fC Aj 
aij = 
a, if Ai =c Aj 
There is no loss in generality if a is made equal 
to unity (a = 1). 
Let X+ = Iaij > 1. aij = PC(Ai,Aj), Ai,Aj E A'. 
tx+ , 2) is a completely ordered set. Hence, given 
aij and ahk in Xt, either a.. > a iJ _ hk Or ahk 2 aije 
Assume that aij 2 ahk. 
For the remaining pairs (Aj.Ai) such that Ai 2 Aj, 
define PC as follows: 
Pc(Aj,Ai) = aji ( aij, PC(Ak,Ah) = akh 5 ahk, 
and a.. < a 
Jl - kh 
if a.. > a 
1~ - hk' 
By construction PC satisfies (1). (2) and (3). 
0 
Let X- = {a.. < 1, aji = Pc(Aj,Ai), Ai.A. E A). 
Ji J 
Let X = (aij = PC(Ai,Aj), Ai,Aj E AI. We have 
x = x+u x-u {ll. 
Theorem 2: If 2 satisfies Axioms 1 and 2 on A, 
there exists a real valued function f: X + X such 
that f[f(aij)] = aij, aij E X. 
Proof: _ From lemma 1 if ai 2 ahk_then aji 2 akh. 
Also, the cardinality of X and X is the same. 
Hence, there exists a bijective mapping f: X -+ X 
such that 
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(1) x > x' if and only if f(x) (f(x'), 
(x) ai:; 2 :: 
exists an isomorphism defined in the set of numer- 
ical intensities of the pairwise comparisons and 
that is a solution of Cauchy's generalized equation 
We now prove by induction that there does not exist 
a x E X for which f[f(x)] # x. 
f(XY) = f(x) f(Y). 
Let n be the cardinality of A. 
For n=2, we have X = Il,a12.a21). By Axiom 1 
either Al 2 A2 or A2 k Al. Assume that Al % A2 
and Al #C A2. By definition, PC(Al.A2) = al2 > 1. 
It is clear that a21 < 1. Thus, we have a12 ) a21. 
If f(a12) = a21, then f(a21) = a12. To see this 
note that if f(a21) # a12, either f(a21) = a21 or 
f(a21) = 1. Since by definition a21 < 1 we have 
f(a21) = a21. But f(x) = x if and only if x = 1, 
hence we have a21 = 1, which contradicts the 
assumption that a21 < 1. Thus, for n = 2 
To justify this equation is even more difficult 
than to assume that the intensity of preferences 
satisfy the reciprocal property. In fact, Axioms 
1 and 2 are consequences of the reciprocal property 
if it is imposed as an axiom. Thus, the reciprocal 
property should be the first axiom of the theory, 
and not the axioms ofstrono completeness and reflex- 
ivity as, for example, utility theory assumes. The 
reciprocal property is weaker than cardinal consist- 
ency which implies ordinal consistency (or transi- 
tivity). Hence, a theory which has the reciprocal 
oroperty as an axiom should be more general than a 
theory that assumes transitivity. 
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Assume that (1) is violated for some i. Thus we 
may write 
f(ak+l,i) ’ ai,ktl 
but 
f(aktl,h) = ah,k+1' for h f 1. 
Let j be such that f(aktl,i ) = aj,ktl. Let i < j 
(the same arqument may be applied for i > j). We 
have f(a k+l,j) = ai k;l' Since ai,ktl 2 aj,ktl 
for i < j, then f(ai,k+l) 2 f(aj k+l) and ak+l i 2 
aktl j, for i < j. This contrad/cts the assumition 
that aktl,i 5 aktl,j for all i < j, and the result 
follows. 
cl 
Let F be the family of bijective mappings from 
X & Rt to X E: R+ such that 
(1) x > x' if and only if f(x) ( f(x'), 
(2) :{!; 5 !, and 
(3) f[f(x)] = x, for all x E X CR+. 
Theorem 3: A necessary and sufficient condition 
for f c F to be the reciprocal property is that f 
be a solution to Cauchy's generalized equation 
f(XY) = f(x) f(Y). 
Proof: Let f E F and f(xy) = f(x) f(y) for all 
x,y E x. The solution of this equation is 
by f(x) = xa. Since f E F, 
and hence a2 = 1. 
we have f[f(x)gire:a2 
f E F also implies that (1 = -1, 
and the result follows. 
CONCLUSIONS 
To obtain the reciprocal property from the set of 
axioms imposed, one must also assume that there 
